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AbstrAct. – Our paper contributes to the literature on financialization of mod-
ern economy and relies on firm staff data instead of the usual company accounts 
data. It uses for this aim several indicators that reveal the direct or indirect power of 
contemporary finance: importance and relative concentration within top paid wagee-
arners, of the finance sector, of holdings in non-finance firms, of business consult-
ing, and of financial managers in non-finance firms. Concentration of the finance 
sector among top wage earners seems to be the most striking phenomenon of the 
financialization process. The article then examines the impact of financialization on 
socio-spatial inequalities. To the increase in inequality, a phenomenon already known 
and demonstrated in our previous work, adds a phenomenon of territory division 
between the “global city” (Greater Paris and in particular its business district of La 
Défense) which has an international financial center and other parts of the territory. 
Thus, the process of spatial segregation becomes massive once we climb high enough 
in the wage distribution and we take into account the workplace. Albeit on a smaller 
scale, the concentration of working rich produced by financialization contributes to 
the residential ghettoization of the wealthiest wage earners.
Keywords. – Centralization; Finance; France; Global city; Inequalities; Spatial 
segregation; Wages.
résumé. – L’article complète les travaux sur la financiarisation des économies 
contemporaines à partir de données portant non pas sur les comptes des entreprises, 
mais sur la composition de leur personnel. Il retient pour cela plusieurs indicateurs 
susceptibles de signer la puissance directe et indirecte de la finance contemporaine : 
l’importance et la concentration relative au sein des fractions les mieux payées des sa-
lariés travaillant dans le secteur de la finance, au sein des holdings des entreprises non-
financières, dans le secteur du conseil aux entreprises ou comme cadres financiers 
des entreprises non-financières. La concentration des salariés de la finance au sein 
des salariés les mieux payés semble être le phénomène le plus marquant du processus 
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de financiarisation. L’article examine ensuite les conséquences de la financiarisation 
sur les inégalités socio-spatiales. À l’accroissement des inégalités, phénomène déjà 
connu et mis en évidence dans nos précédents travaux, s’ajoute un phénomène de 
fractionnement du territoire entre la « ville globale » (le grand Paris et en particulier 
son quartier d’affaires de La Défense) qui possède un centre financier international et 
les autres parties du territoire. Ainsi, le processus de ségrégation spatiale devient massif 
dès lors qu’on monte assez haut dans la distribution des salaires et qu’on prend en 
compte le lieu de travail. Quoique de moindre ampleur, la concentration des salariés 
riches, produite par la financiarisation, participe à la ghettoïsation résidentielle des 
salariés les plus fortunés.
mots clés. – Centralisation ; Finance ; France ; Inégalités ; Spatial ségrégation ; 
Salaires ; Ville globale.
A large consensus has arisen that, since the 1980s, the economy 
has been changed by the process of financialization, and that this 
process affects not only the modes of financial exchange, but also, 
more broadly, social and economic structure and inequalities (Flig-
stein 2001; Krippner 2005). The impact of financialization on social 
inequalities and cohesion is often handled in the media in spectacular 
terms such as “stock market layoffs,” comparing the impoverishment 
of some (the laid-off workers) with the enrichment of others (the 
capital gains of stockholders). While there can hardly be any doubt 
as to the existence of the layoffs, their causal relationship to the stock 
market is actually hazy – it is not clear that such layoffs would not 
have taken place in a less financialized economic system – and their 
impact on capital gains is uncertain (Capelle-Blancard and Couderc 
2006). While financialization admittedly has repercussions on man-
agement of ordinary staff in nonfinancial companies (Montagne and 
Sauviat 2001), particularly regarding the sustainability of jobs and the 
use of layoffs or variable compensation, the causality involved in its 
impact through those channels on the structure of inequality is long, 
complex, and therefore uncertain. 
On the other hand, financialization potentially has a more direct 
impact on inequalities by reason of the categories of employees that 
it promotes: those in charge of financial matters, whether they are 
employed in the financial sector or work as finance specialists in 
nonfinancial companies. A number of studies have begun to show 
the size of incomes collected by employees in the financial sector 
and its role in increasing inequality (Philippon and Reshef 2009; Bell 
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and Van Reenen 2010; Godechot 2012), especially in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France, but thus far they have 
barely begun to address the question of financialization outside the 
financial sector. 
Studies of inequality concentrating on national distributions of 
wage and income (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010; Piketty 2001) 
sometimes tend to give the impression that the increase of income 
and (especially) wage inequalities is a phenomenon that affects the 
entire economy, that is, all economic sectors and all regions indis-
criminately. However, the financialization process does not apply 
equally throughout a given country, owing to the historic concentra-
tion of financial activity in major financial centers such as New York, 
London, and Paris (Sassen 2001, 2005). Nevertheless, the demateri-
alization and computerization of financial activity could potentially 
allow financial activity to be liberated from these historic centers, 
promoting a desegregation process. Saskia Sassen (2001, 2005) affirms 
that globalization and computerization are promoting the growth, 
opulence, and segregation of the major financial centers, rather than 
making a dent in them. They contribute to the emergence of “global 
cities” due to the added value offered by idiosyncratic information 
transmitted face to face rather than standardized information trans-
mitted electronically, as well as the added value of strategic control 
and organization jobs over the classic delocalized production and dis-
tribution jobs. Following these hypotheses, this globalization/finan-
cialization movement would thus favor the growth of sociospatial 
inequalities, both between the global cities and the rest of the country 
as well as within the global cities themselves.
This last hypothesis leads us to infer from this emergence of global 
cities an increase in spatial segregation, not only at work, but also in 
residential areas by income level. In the case of the United States, 
Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff (2011) have thus demonstrated 
a causal relationship between the increase in income inequality and 
spatial segregation, but they do not specify the areas most affected by 
this increased move toward polarization. One might suppose that the 
major financial centers, such as New York or London, play a role in 
this process, both because they have a concentration of financial jobs 
and because the high wages that they offer promote residential strate-
gies of social avoidance (Maurin 2004).
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We propose to connect several areas of research on present-day 
inequality that remain too compartmentalized – income inequality 
(Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010), financialization (Krippner 2005), 
social geography (Sassen 2001), and social segregation (Reardon and 
Bischoff 2011) – testing the positive relationships between financial-
ization, the increase in wage inequality, the emergence of global cities, 
and social segregation at home and at work. We will examine these ties 
using administrative wage data from the DADS (Déclarations Annu-
elles de Données Sociales: “Annual Declarations of Social Data”) filed 
on employees by companies in the private sector, with representative 
data (1/24th of files) since 19761 and exhaustive data since 1994. 
The first part of this article will discuss indicators of financializa-
tion. The second will show that financialization and the increase in 
inequality primarily affect the Île-de-France region, while the third 
will show that such a movement promotes an increase in segregation 
at work and (to a lesser degree) in residential areas, but in all cases 
promotes increased social separatism among the most highly compen-
sated employees. Finally, in the last section, we will try to clarify the 
contribution of financialization to this dynamic of social separatism.
1. Financialization and Wage Structure
Financialization is a complex and diverse process that has unde-
niably affected Western economies over the past thirty years, to the 
point that it has become the object of broad social protests in recent 
years (with the “Occupy Wall Street” movement), as well as an elec-
toral campaign issue. The exact impact of this phenomenon and its 
full implications remain difficult to define, as it is manifested at so 
many different levels: from the impact of stock prices on politics to 
mortgage approval procedures, as well as accounting methods used to 
calculate the performance of firms.
The socioeconomic literature on financialization (Deutschmann 
2011; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Krippner 2005; Epstein 
2005) distinguishes among several levels of financialization, depend-
ing on the sector (financial or nonfinancial) and the scale (at the 
1. The author received access to this data from the CASD (Secure Remote Access
Center) dedicated to researchers granted authorization based on the recommendation of 
the French Statistical Confidentiality Committee. 
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macroeconomic level, the firm organization level, and the levels of 
the individual consumer and investor).
Financialization is manifested first and foremost through an inter-
nal change in the modes of financial intermediation. While financial 
markets occupied a relatively anecdotal place in economic life in the 
1960s, to the point that some commentators predicted their demise, 
institutional changes of the past twenty-five years have helped to 
place them once again at the heart of the action. First of all, the end of 
the fixed-exchange-rate regime in the early 1970s, based on the Bret-
ton Woods Agreement, revived the exchange market. Faced with the 
inflation crisis of the 1970s (Krippner 2011), Western countries, par-
ticularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, intro-
duced policies to revive the market. They suppressed and dismantled 
barriers deemed to be anticompetitive, such as fixed brokerage fees, 
the Compagnie des Agents de Change, or even the Glass-Steagall Act; 
they added many new products (especially derivatives) and market 
segments; and they participated in the computerization of transac-
tions and promoted individuals’ participation in the stock market by 
favoring pension funds (Montagne 2006). The combination of this 
promarket policy and the game playing in the international exchange 
that promoted the accumulation of liquid assets (petrodollars, Chi-
nese trade surplus, the highly accommodating monetary policy in the 
OECD countries starting in 2001) led people to turn more and more 
to financial markets. Transaction volumes soared spectacularly dur-
ing the periods of 1977-1987, when the Paris stock exchange grew 
elevenfold (Godechot 2012), 1995-2000 (grew sevenfold), and 2004-
2007 (doubled). This unprecedented expansion was accompanied by 
changes in financial behaviors, among which we will highlight grow-
ing support for risk quantification (McKenzie 2006) and for liquid-
ity (Orléan 1999) – the possibility of reversing a financial position 
quickly and at minimal cost – short-termism, and the development 
of a generalized arbitration (with a speculative component) of related 
financial products.
Financialization is not limited to finance alone; it leaves its mark 
on other economic sectors. First, the strategies and work organization 
specific to financial markets are being applied to a growing number 
of nonfinancial product markets called “commodities” (energy prod-
ucts, raw materials, agricultural products). Next, large firms are often 
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equipped with internal trading floors to manage their cash flow and 
their risks, and to this end they employ small “trading” teams. They 
often dispose of banking subsidiaries in order to promote credit sales. 
More generally, beyond these niche financial professions, financializa-
tion is also changing management standards. 
The new standards are often spread by consulting firms. Some of 
them, like Stern Stewart & Co. with its patented accounting concept 
known as EVA (Economic Value Added), have played a widely recog-
nized role in the dissemination of financial logic (Lordon 2000; Froud 
and Williams 2000). The model of the multidivisional firm, whose 
favored objectives were diversification and expansion, gave way to the 
model of the firm dedicated to creating shareholder value (Fligstein 
2001), restricted to its core business, the goal of which is to maxi-
mize the company’s stock market value. The financial strategies of 
liquidity, risk measurement, benchmarking, arbitrage, and discounted 
cash flow were introduced into nonfinancial firms for the choice of 
investments, accounting valuation, or work organization, at the cost 
of classic industrial and business strategies. The company is broken 
down into as many profit centers as basic units, the value of each 
being measured in the light of its potential resale value on the mar-
ket. A symptom of this sea change is the growing power of financial 
directors at the head of firms and their designation as “chief financial 
officer,” replacing chief operating officers (Zorn 2004; Zorn et al. 
2005). Though this movement was initiated by a change in U.S. tax 
code (Zorn 2004), its continuation was promoted by the shareholder 
value ideology, the hostile IPOs of the 1980s, and the increased role 
of financial analysts in establishing stock prices (Zorn et al. 2005).
At the macroeconomic level, Greta Krippner (2005) and, more 
recently, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Ken-Hou Lin (2011) 
have found the distribution of profits in the U.S. economy a bet-
ter marker of financialization than the evolution of financial work 
could possibly be. The weight of the finance/insurance/real estate 
sector peaked at 45% of profits, whereas the same sector oscillated 
between 10% and 20% between 1950 and 1980 (Krippner 2005; 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Krippner has also analyzed the 
growing portion of financial revenues in nonfinancial firms as a 
symptom of the financialization of the nonfinancial sector (2005). 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) have also analyzed the widening 
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gap between average wages paid in the financial sector and those 
paid in the nonfinancial sector; they estimate that, between 1981 
and 2008, six trillion dollars were transferred from the nonfinancial 
sector to the financial sector. 
The Ascendancy of the Financial Sector
Based on national accounting data, duplicating the financializa-
tion approach based on the distribution of profits does not produce 
similar results in the case of France. The proportion of total gross oper-
ating income, distributed income, and gross disposable income held by 
financial companies appears, on initial examination, stable.2 Similarly, 
when one attempts to measure the ascendancy of the financial sec-
tor through the evolution of its numbers in the workforce, it is clear, 
as Krippner (2005) found, that this indicator is hardly a reflection of 
the massive financialization of the labor force. The proportion of the 
workforce employed in the financial sector has changed very little 
(Figure 1).3 One of the reasons for this quantitative indicator’s lack of 
sensitivity is related to the heterogeneity of the financial sector. This 
sector includes traditional banks, retail banks, and banks that finance 
small firms, all of which have little to do with financial markets, and 
which could not be said to have been the vector of financialization; it 
also includes “corporate and investment banks,” which are particularly 
emblematic of that process. And yet, while corporate banks were add-
ing employees, retail banks during the same period adopted a strat-
egy of rationalization and staff reduction (Dressen and Roux-Rossi 
1997). At the aggregate level, these two contradictory trends – difficult 
to separate, due to insufficiently detailed sector designations and the 
French universal-bank model, which includes retail, corporate, and 
investment banking under one label – cancel each other out.
2. Sources: the datasets “7.202 – Compte des institutions financières (S12A) (En
milliards d’euros)” and “7.101 – Compte des sociétés non financières (S11) (En milliards 
d’euros),” Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, available at http://
www.insee.fr/en/themes/theme.asp?theme=16&sous_theme=5.3. Nevertheless, it is to be 
noted that the concept of company profit is poorly represented by gross operating income, 
because it does not take financing costs or property income into consideration. This limita-
tion is particularly true of financial companies.
3. We define the financial sector as the combination of financial intermediation (sec-
tor 65 in NAF 2003) and auxiliary financial services (sector 67.1 in NAF 2003). Insur-
ance and the real estate sector are excluded, which is not the case in Krippner (2005) and 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011a).
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Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) nevertheless supplement the 
profit-based approach with an approach that considers wages, show-
ing that wages in the financial sector have taken off by comparison 
with those in other sectors. However, as shown by Philippon and 
Reshef (2009), excessive wages in the financial sector are a direct 
consequence of financial deregulation measures in the United States. 
Approaching financialization not only through average wage lev-
els, but also at the highest ends of the spectrum (Godechot 2012), 
could be the way to see the new centrality of finance, owing to its 
wage share. This leads us to use wage data, from the DADS (see box), 
to isolate the share and the effect of the employees who participate 
the most and, potentially, profit the most from the phenomenon of 
financialization. Working with individual data is particularly recom-
mended when one wishes to show the impact of this phenomenon 
on inequality and the spatial distribution thereof.4 
DADS (Déclarations annuelles de données sociales:  
“Annual Declarations of Social Data”):  
A Key Source for the Study of Wages in France 
On the basis of these administrative sources, two main data 
sets are available. The first is the DADS Panel (1976-2007), which 
contains 1/24th of private-sector wages from 1976 to 2001 and 
1/12th of the same population from 2002 forward. The second set is 
made up of the exhaustive files of all jobs in the private sector from 
1994 through 2008.
Because the numbers of hours declared are not always accu-
rate, and because hourly wage is not necessarily the best approach 
for finding high wages (which in certain professions, such as con-
sulting or acting, may depend on a small number of hours), we 
have chosen to use the concept of annual wage, the sum of pay 
received during the year in all jobs held by the employee. This 
requires us to set aside the intentionally low wages of individuals 
who work very little in the private sector over the course of a year 
(students’ summer jobs, etc.). We are keeping only those employees 
making more than half of the minimum wage annually. In the files, 
the concept of gross wage appeared better suited to representing 
4. In our previous work (Godechot 2012), we discussed in greater detail the advan-
tages and limitations of this source and the specific choices of wage definition.
D
ocum
ent downloaded from
 www.cairn-int.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.93 - 24/07/2014 11h31. © P.U.F. 
Financialization and Sociospatial Divides IX
wage-related phenomena (better coverage of different elements, 
greater stability over time). It does not, however, cover nonwage 
elements of compensation, such as stock options or allocation of 
shares, which leads us to underestimate a portion of the increase in 
inequality (Godechot 2012).
Aside from information about wage, number of hours, sec-
tor, and company, the databases contain information regarding the 
employee: sex, age, municipality of work and of residence (the latter 
only after 1993), and social category. 
Let us highlight a few breaks in our datasets: 
– First, in the exhaustive files, it is impossible to identify an
employee from one job to another during the period from 1994 
to 2001. Thus we are using the gross annual wages of full-time, 
nonsecondary jobs when these are greater than half of a minimum 
wage. This leads to setting aside some employees who worked mul-
tiple jobs during the year. The population is thus reduced by 16%. 
The exhaustive files of the year 2002, which also cover the year 
N-1, allow us to make a comparison between the two sets for the 
year 2001. 
– Within the panel, the doubling of the covered population
in 2002 (going from 1/24th to 1/12th of the workforce) may also 
introduce a modification of the representation of segregation phe-
nomena measured on a small scale. 
– Certain name changes also affect our study. The nomenclature
of the Socioprofessional Categories (“Catégories Socioprofession-
nelles” – CS) and the Socioprofessional Professions and Categories 
(“Professions et Catégories Socioprofessionnelles” – PCS) changed 
between 1982 and 1984 and between 2002 and 2003. Similarly, 
the sector names changed in 1993 and in 2008 (Nomenclature 
of Professional Activities [“Nomenclature d’Activités Profession-
nelles” – NAP], Nomenclature of French Activities [“Nomenclature 
d’Activités Française” – NAF] – 1993, then 2008).
Even though they do not cover the public sector and do not 
allow us to find nonwage income, the DADS are a privileged source 
for the study of wages with a significant level of detail and over a 
relatively long period of time. They make it possible to evaluate the 
evolution of the place of certain sectors in wage distribution. 
Figure 1 summarizes a certain number of results that we had estab-
lished in our previous work dealing with the contribution of finance 
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to wage inequality (Godechot 2012). The percentage of the full popu-
lation of private-sector employees working in the financial sector has 
remained stable overall, and in fact has declined since the mid-1980s 
(from 3.5% to 3%). On the other hand, despite this overall stability, 
the higher one rises in the pay hierarchy, the greater the proportion of 
finance workers in the sample; this number has risen rapidly. Within 
the top ten percent, after a progression of one point at the begin-
ning of the period, we observe the financial sector’s share stabilizing at 
about 8%. Within the top 1%, the growth of this sector has been steady, 
having doubled its share (from 6% to 12%) over the past twenty years. 
The slope is even more impressive when we concentrate on the top 
0.1% of the nation’s earners with the highest wages. Within that group, 
the portion of finance workers has grown very rapidly, especially dur-
ing the latter half of the 1990s, reaching 24%, or ten times their weight 
(in terms of odds ratio) in the rest of the wage distribution. 
Figure 1: The share of finance employees among employees 
of different wage percentiles
Note: In 2007, 24.1% of employees in the top permille (0.1% of the highest paid) 
worked in finance.
Source: DADS Panel (1976-2007).
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Wage distribution within the financial sector is considerably 
stretched out, to such a degree that it significantly transforms the 
level and the structure of inequalities. The wage share of the top 
0.1% of earners rose from 1.2% to 2%, and nearly half of this increase 
went to the financial sector (Godechot 2012), a phenomenon simi-
lar to that which has taken place in the United Kingdom (Bell and 
Van Reenen 2010) and even in the United States (Bakija, Cole, and 
Heim 2010). All signs indicate that this movement is the result of the 
“financialization of finance,” or the increasing influence of the finan-
cial markets within financial and banking intermediation activities. 
It is strongly correlated with financial conditions (the mid-1980s 
boom, then the collapse following the 1987 crash and the Gulf War, 
a boom in the latter half of the 1990s followed by the 2002 reces-
sion, the mid-2000s boom) and with transaction volume (Godechot 
2012), as well as with the significant weight of the socioprofes-
sional professions and categories (PCS) “financial market executives” 
among the highest-paid finance workers (a classification measured 
only since 2003). 
The Financialization of Nonfinancial Firms
If the stretching of finance wages results, in a relatively obvious 
way, from the process of financialization and, consequently, repre-
sents it relatively well, it would nevertheless be incorrect to con-
sider the effects of financialization as limited to the financial sector 
alone. Particularly in the United States, the ideological movement 
of “shareholder comeback” is manifested less by the mobilization of 
shareholders, as groups of natural persons, than by the development 
in the 1980s of mergers and acquisitions financed through leverag-
ing (thanks to junk bonds) that made it possible for financial raiders 
to dismantle conglomerates (Zorn et al. 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey 
and Lin 2011, Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). In this threat envi-
ronment, firms did not adopt all of the recommendations of finan-
cial governance from the financial theory of the firm, sometimes 
spread by management consulting firms (Lordon 2000; Froud and 
Williams 2000), but only those most directly related to short-term 
stock prices, in particular the promotion of financial directors to the 
rank of Chief Financial Officer (Deputy Director General) (Zorn et 
D
ocum
ent downloaded from
 www.cairn-int.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.93 - 24/07/2014 11h31. © P.U.F. 
XII Olivier Godechot
al. 2005) or the development of practices indexing directors’ com-
pensation according to stock prices (Dobbin and Jung 2011). In the 
United States, one of the consequences of financialization is the 
growth in pay inequality and the rise of managerial wages (Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2013).
Using the DADS, can one find evidence of the financialization 
of nonfinancial companies? The task is difficult, and the indicators 
that we have selected are rather mediocre. Drawing inspiration from 
Dirk M. Zorn’s approach (Zorn 2005; Zorn et al. 2005), we have 
attempted to see whether financial professions in nonfinancial com-
panies have grown both in number and in special recognition. It is 
difficult to isolate the position of financial director as well as the 
previously mentioned jobs have been isolated. Based on the four-
digit PCS, one might define the professions of executives in admin-
istrative, accounting, and financial services, among which financial 
executives, though not isolated, are the most numerous.5 Addition-
ally, the quality of the four-digit PCS, the nomenclature of which 
changed in 2003, is very poor in the DADS: it is all but unusable 
prior to 1997 and does not really improve until 2001, with less 
than one-third of earners having manifestly erroneous or missing 
codes. Despite the limitations of the data, the exercise produces the 
following results: an overall stability in the numbers of executives 
related to corporate finance and a slight growth in their share of 
the highest levels of wage distribution, particularly in the top 0.1% 
(Figure 2). Nevertheless, we will take a cautious view regarding any 
such change. 
5. In the 2003 PCS nomenclature, one finds the following professions: 372a, Exec-
utives Responsible for Economic, Financial, and Business Studies; 372b, Executives for 
Organization or Supervision of Administrative and Financial Services; 373a, Executives for 
Financial or Accounting Services in Large Companies; 373c, Executives for Financial or 
Accounting Services in Small and Midsize Companies.
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Figure 2: The share of employees in corporate finance among 
the top 0.1% of employees and the total population
Note: In 2007, 14.1% of the top 0.1% of employees worked in the sector of firm 
administration (741J), with holdings. The change of nomenclature in the PCS in 2003 
causes a break in the data.
Source: DADS Exhaustive Files (1995-2007).
Faced with the limitations of the PCS to grasp this phenomenon, 
it is possible to return to the sector data, which are of better qual-
ity than the PCS in the DADS. Two sectors caught our attention in 
the 1993 NAF list. The first, 741J – Firm Administration, includes 
“holding activities”: to wit, the companies, generally with reduced 
personnel, within a group that exert primarily financial control over 
the other productive subsidies in the group. In 2007, according to a 
Liaison Financière (LIFI) study, those coded firms represented just 
1.3% of wage-earners, but 38% of group heads. This method of orga-
nizing activity reflects certain characteristics of financialization: the 
primacy of financial indicators over industrial or commercial indica-
tors. The second, 741G – Business and Management Consulting, only 
indirectly represents the financialization of non-financial companies. 
Often, these consulting firms are small or midsize companies whose 
internal operations are hardly financialized. They have nonetheless 
contributed, through the advice they dispense to large companies, 
to promoting a financialization strategy, as shown in studies on the 
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proliferation of shareholder management systems (Lordon 2000; 
Froud and Williams 2000).
Though they remain modest, these two sectors have increased 
their share in the overall workforce; the former grew from 0.8% to 
1% between 1995 and 2007; the latter, from 0.5% to 0.9%. What is 
more, as evidence of the importance and value attributed to these 
(directly or indirectly) financial positions, their share in the top 0.1% 
of wages has grown even more aggressively, rising from 3.3% to 6.7% 
for consulting and from 9% to 14.4% for the firm administration sec-
tor. If the rise on the consulting side is more pronounced, that is more 
a reflection of the development of the sector as a whole. Holdings are 
advancing, according to a rise in their overrepresentation at the top 
of the pay hierarchy.
Even if we do not identify the precise impact of financialization 
in nonfinancial firms in a very strict way, we have a set of indicators 
showing the growing recognition of the professions responsible for 
implementing it. This movement remains, however, lesser in scope 
than that which we have observed in the financial sector, which con-
sequently justifies considering the latter as the archetypal sector of 
financialization.
2. Financialization and the Global City
What impact might financialization have on sociospatial inequal-
ity? Saskia Sassen, in her book on global cities (2001), looks at the 
question more broadly, studying the effects of globalization, of which 
she considers financialization to be a crucial element. At a time of 
globalized production of goods and services, the concept of a “global 
city” serves first and foremost, in her view, as a name for the places in 
which globally dispersed economic activity is coordinated – a coor-
dination that simultaneously takes organizational, computerized, and 
financial forms (Sassen 2004). However, these new venues for coor-
dination are not without ties to the traditional forms of territorial 
centralization.
One might expect a decline in traditional major urban cen-
ters as a result of globalization. The drop in transportation costs and 
the global nature of markets, on the sides of both production and 
demand, could lead one to question the primacy of traditional major 
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urban centers such as New York, London, Tokyo, or Paris, where it 
is particularly expensive to settle. In finance, the “drop in transporta-
tion costs” has taken an even more radical form. Securitization and 
dematerialization have radically liberated financial activity from its 
traditional locales. Some stars in the world of finance have taken 
advantage of this to set up their financial activity far from Wall Street, 
one example being Michael Milken, who established his business in 
the field of junk bonds in Los Angeles in the 1980s. 
Sassen explains in her book that the scattering of production made 
possible by globalization actually leads us to reassert the value of cen-
tral job duties, and that their growing complexity requires increased 
demand for firms that specialize in providing services to other busi-
nesses (2001). Far from being destabilized, jobs in corporate finance 
and the services most needed by businesses (market finance, consulting, 
etc.) have become concentrated in the major urban centers. Further-
more, market finance itself is hardly threatened by the dematerializa-
tion of financial life. Face-to-face social contact and informal contact 
networks continue to play a major role, both as a medium for building 
a collective financial opinion and as a nexus that structures the labor 
market. This promotes the adhesion of market finance to a few centers 
(Sassen 2005). Furthermore, certain niches of financial activity, such as 
high-frequency algorithmic trading (Lenglet 2011), which performs 
brief microarbitrages of stock prices by means of automated transac-
tion programs, are all the more profitable when located as close as 
possible to the computers of stock exchange institutions, which act as 
auctioneers and organize the finalization of transactions.
From this analysis, one might deduce that the traditional finan-
cial capital of a country will be strengthened by the financialization 
process, rather than destabilized by new opportunities to break free 
from the territory. 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the categories that (imper-
fectly) reflect corporate finance workers among the top 0.1% of 
earners in Île-de-France and in the French provinces, respectively. 
The overall level of financialization is higher in Île-de-France. How-
ever, while these professions are generally advancing in the top 0.1%, 
as previously indicated, as well as in their respective geographic areas, 
it is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding a difference in pace. If 
such a difference must be determined, it would be more in favor of 
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the provinces, which seem to be making up for some lost time where 
corporate finance is concerned. 
Figure 3: The share of employees in corporate finance among  
the top 0.1% of employees in the provinces and in Île-de-France
Note: In 2007, 16.5% of employees in top 0.1% in Île-de-France worked in the firm 
administration sector (741J). 14.4% of the top 0.1% of employees in the provinces 
work in the same sector.
The change of nomenclature in the PCS in 2003 creates a break in the data. 
The distinction between the provinces and Île-de-France is based here on 
workplace. The proportion within the top 0.1% of each geographic region has 
been calculated and not within the total of both together. The threshold for 
membership in the top 0.1% thus differs for each of the two regions.
Source: DADS Exhaustive Files (1995-2007).
There is a significant contrast with what is observed in the 
financial sector. Indeed, as shown in figure 4, finance workers’ share 
of the top 1% and the top 0.1% of wages in Île-de-France grew 
sharply, rising in the former case from 6% in 1976 to 21% in 2007 
and in the latter case from 5% to 37%, while over the same period 
the same sector’s share of the highest echelons of provincial wages 
barely changed at all. 
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Figure 4: The share of employees in the finance sector among  
employees in the provinces or Île-de-France (total, top 1%, and top 0.1%)
Note: In 2007, 37 % of employees in the top 0.1% in Île-de-France worked in 
the finance sector.
The distinction between the provinces and Île-de-France is based here on 
workplace. The proportion within the top 0.1% of each geographic region has 
been calculated and not within the total of both together. The threshold for 
membership in the top 0.1% thus differs for each of the two regions.
Source: DADS Sample (1976-2007).
What is the relationship between this move toward financial-
ization and the dynamic of inequality in each of these regions? In 
the provinces, the wage gap remained remarkably stable. The top 1% 
accounted for between 5% and 5.2% of total wages in the provinces, 
while the top 0.1% accounted for between 1% and 1.2% (Figure 5). In 
Île-de-France, on the other hand, inequality grew considerably. The 
top percentile’s share of wages went from 6% to nearly 9% between 
1996 and 2007; the top 0.1% went from 1.3% to 2.7%; and the top 
0.01% went from 0.27% to 0.82%. 55% of the increase in total wages 
for the top 1% in Île-de-France between those two dates, as well as 
62% of the increase for the top 0.1% and 77% of the increase for the 
top 0.01%, went to employees of the financial sector. 
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Figure 5: Share of the top 1% and top 0.1% within the total wages 
of the provinces and the Île-de-France
Note: In 2007, the top 1% of Île-de-France received 8.8% of the total wages of Île-de-
France; the top 1% of the provinces received 5.4% of the total wages of the provinces. 
The proportions have been calculated separately for both regions. The threshold 
for membership in the top 1% and 0.1% thus differ between the two regions.
Source: DADS Sample (1976-2007).
We can therefore conclude that the rise in wage inequality in 
France since the mid-1990s (Landais 2008; Solard 2010; Godechot 
2012) is largely due to the increase in inequality in Île-de-France, 
which in turn is caused in large part (two-thirds, approximately) by 
the rise in top wages in the financial sector – and thus by the “finan-
cialization of finance” – and to a smaller degree (more difficult to 
calculate, due to the imprecision of our indicators) to the financializa-
tion of nonfinancial companies. 
One consequence of this increase in high wages in Île-de-France 
is that the highest earners in the provinces are clearly falling behind 
by comparison. The pay distribution gap between Île-de-France and 
the provinces is, admittedly, growing overall (see Appendix). The 
average wage in Île-de-France has gone from 1.32 times the average 
wage in the provinces in 1970 to 1.44 times the average wage in the 
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provinces in 2000. Nevertheless, this divergence is growing primarily 
at the top of the distribution; the difference in the threshold for the 
top 1% in the two areas has gone from 1.53 to 1.89 (Appendix). The 
portion of workers in the top-earning percentile who are private-
sector employees working in the provinces dropped from 46% to 
35% between 1976 and 2007. Looking at only the top 0.1%, the 
decline is even more pronounced, with those in the provinces falling 
from 41% to 21% (Figure 6). If we approach the question by place of 
residence rather than by place of work, the evolution, though some-
what less striking, remains pronounced. The portion of the top 0.1% 
residing in the provinces declined, from 40% to 25%. In light of this 
wage quantile and this rough spatial categorization of Île-de-France 
vs. the provinces, we have evidence of a rather marked phenomenon 
of spatial segregation.
 Figure 6: Share of different fractiles living 
and working in the provinces
Note: In 2007, 77% of private-sector employees lived in the provinces, and 75% 
worked in the provinces; 25% of the top 0.1% highest paid private-sector 
employees lived in the provinces, and 21% worked there.
Source: DADS Sample (1976-2007).
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On this macroscopic scale, this phenomenon of segregation 
results less from residential choices within small geographic units and 
a phenomenon of social avoidance than from the spatial localization 
of activity – namely, the concentration of financial market manage-
ment and intervention activities – and from the unequal distribution 
of wages for activities unequally distributed throughout the country. 
Thus the concentration of high earners in Île-de-France must be 
put in perspective with the development of the business districts around 
Paris. In terms of places of work, Paris has a concentration of between 
35% and 45% of the top 0.1% of earners throughout the period stud-
ied. The Hauts-de-Seine department, on the other hand, saw its share 
grow considerably, rising from 10% of the top 0.1% in 1976 to more 
than 30% in 2007. During the same period, the share for the munici-
palities of Puteaux and Courbevoie, in which the La Défense district is 
located, rose from 2% to 12% of the top-earning 0.1% of workers. In 
2007, the top 0.1% of earners constituted 1.2% of the employees work-
ing in these two municipalities, one of the highest rates in the country, 
behind the 8th arrondissement of Paris and Neuilly (1.3%).
These results lead us to confirm, but also to nuance, the hypoth-
eses of Saskia Sassen (2001). Contemporary economic changes have 
indeed considerably strengthened the great megacities and the Pari-
sian region in France, but this is due above all to the financialization 
of finance, far more than to the financialization of corporates, never 
mind globalization or the reorganization of production.
3.The Evolution of Sociospatial Segregation
Is the impact of the financialization manifested primarily in Île-
de-France enough to significantly modify the degree of sociospatial 
segregation? Do the highest earners and the lowest earners live more 
separately from each other than they did before? There have been 
relatively few studies of this issue – the usual angle being the segrega-
tion of minorities, rather than socioeconomic segregation – and they 
are often contradictory.
On the one hand, Saskia Sassen (2001) has shown that the rise 
in power of global cities has gone hand in hand with an increase in 
inequality between those cities and the rest of their countries, as well 
as a rise in inequality within those cities themselves. However, she 
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does not propose any specific measure of spatial segregation. Sean 
F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff (2011), using a study of the one 
hundred largest metropolitan areas in the United Sates, have shown 
a three-point increase (or a multiplication by 1.3) in their indicator 
of spatial segregation in those cities between 1970 and 2000, and 
that this rise in spatial segregation (by income rank) was as strong as 
the rise in absolute income inequality (measured by the Gini index). 
In particular, they show that a rise of one standard deviation in the 
income inequality indicator led to a rise of 25% of the standard devi-
ation of the segregation index. 
In France, Éric Maurin (2004), based on a study of the social 
homogeneity of survey strata from the Employment Survey 
(100,000 people surveyed per year), found socioeconomic residential 
segregation stable in France between 1991 and 2002. Similarly, Nina 
Guyon (2012), using exhaustive tax data for Île-de-France between 
2000 and 2009, drew a similar conclusion. All of the many segregation 
indicators used indicate overall stability in the level of segregation in 
Île-de-France; in greater detail, they reveal a noticeable rise between 
2000 and 2002, stability from 2002 to 2008, and a drop between 2008 
and 2009. On the other hand, based on the 1990 and 1999 census, 
Edmond Préteceille (2006) observed an increase in the segregation of 
private-sector executives and the liberal professions in Île-de-France 
during that period. These studies tend to remain very general in nature 
(an overall segregation index with a possible study of the top and bot-
tom deciles) and do not isolate with sufficient precision the levels of 
income-related stratification most affected by financialization.
We propose to examine this issue with the help of the DADS, which 
admittedly present some flaws, but also numerous advantages. Among 
the flaws, we are working with an incomplete population: private-sector 
employees. Many others who also contribute to the phenomenon of 
spatial segregation – public-sector employees, the self-employed, the 
unemployed, and those outside of the workforce – are missing. Next, 
the smallest geographic unit available to us is the municipality of work 
or of residence, the sizes of which are highly variable, and based on their 
dimensions, these will reflect more or less accurately a phenomenon of 
copresence or avoidance.6 However, these flaws are counterbalanced by 
6. In the case of large cities (Lyon, Paris, Marseille), however, we do have access to
the arrondissements.
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several advantages: a good description of wages and very good coverage 
of the population concerned, both in the 1/24th sample from 1976 and 
2001 and in the 1/12th sample from 2002 to 2007, and even more so in 
the exhaustive files from 1994 to 2008.
To calculate segregation, we are using the classic Duncan dis-
similarity index: D
g
 = 0.5* ∑
i
|n
gi
/n
g.
 – n
-gi
/n
-g.
| where n
gi
 represents
the number of group g in geographic unit i and n
-gi
 represents the 
number of other groups (-g representing groups other than g) in the 
same unit, while n
g.
 and n
-g.
 represent the number of g groups and 
of other groups in the total population. This aggregate index has a 
simple interpretation: it represents the portion of the population of 
group g that would have to be displaced in order to obtain an equi-
proportional distribution of the group in all territorial units. Based 
on this classic index, Sean F. Reardon and Glenn Firebaugh propose a 
multi-group dissimilarity index as a weighted sum of the indicators of 
each group: D = [∑
g
 (n
g.
/n) * (1 – n
g.
/n). D
g
]/[∑
g
 (n
g.
/n) * (1 – n
g.
/n)]. 
We are dividing the population into five relative wage groups: F0-25, 
the lowest-paid quartile; F25-75, the two median quartiles; F75-90, 
the bottom portion of the top quartile; F90-99, the comfortable top 
decile (minus the top 1%); and F99-100, the top 1%. This definition 
does not depend on absolute wage level, but only on rank within the 
wage ladder. Therefore, an absolute rise in wage has no automatic 
impact on the spatial distribution of relative wages. 
Figure 7 presents the evolution of the multigroup dissimilarity 
index for the municipality of work and residence in France, Île-de-
France, and the provinces, as well as the department of residence and 
work.7 Above all, it presents a certain number of characteristics in 
level. In the provinces, workplaces are a bit more segregated than 
places of residence. We find rather the opposite phenomenon in Île-
de-France. Furthermore, the level of residential segregation in Île-
de-France is higher than in the provinces, while in terms of work 
segregation, the opposite seems to be the case.8 
7. The results derived from the sample are not directly comparable to those from the
exhaustive files, particularly for the municipalities. The population of small municipali-
ties may be poorly represented due to sample sizes in the panel, which could potentially 
exaggerate the gaps in an equiproportional representation.
8. The change in the set in 2001, which makes it possible to take into account better
those employees working more than one job during the year, leads to a significant jump in 
the index for the municipality of employment.
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Figure 7: Synthetic indicators of spatial segregation
Note: In 2008, the index of dissimilarity based on municipalities of work 
(exhaustive) rose to 21.9%. Thus 21.9% of the population would have to move 
their places of work for the composition of each municipality to be equivalent 
to the overall composition. Calculations for Île-de-France (and respectively for 
the provinces) measure spatial segregation in Île-de-France and are based on the 
salary level of persons working in Île-de-France.
Source: Exhaustive Files (1994-2008) and DADS Sample (1976-2007).
On the other hand, on initial examination, the graph does not 
present any particularly clear changes. The observation oscillates, 
depending on the sets and the indicators, between stability and a 
slight increase. Let us look at this in detail. 
In terms of place of work, the observation shows a slight increase 
in segregation. Based on the sample, we get a relatively clear rise in 
spatial segregation between 1976 and 1993. The overall dissimilarity 
index rises from 1.4 points (department) to 2 points (municipality), 
or multiplication by 1.12-1.13 in terms of odds ratio. What follows 
is a bit more ambiguous and will differ according to the selected set 
(sample or exhaustive). We will summarize this with overall stability 
between 1994 and 2001 and another rise (based on the exhaustive 
files) of about 2 points between 2001 and 2008, whether we are 
looking at the whole sample, Île-de-France, or the provinces (multi-
plication by 1.15). Even conservatively, we can therefore summarize 
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this overall evolution with an observation of a slight rise in spatial 
segregation at work. 
In terms of place of residence, the overall observation is one of 
strong stability beginning in the mid-1990s. The dissimilarity rate stood 
at 16.65% in 1995 and at 16.74% in 2008, with the rate varying by 
hardly more than half a point at any time during this period. We largely 
confirm Eric Maurin’s analyses (2004). Nevertheless, let us first note 
that prior to this period, the index based on department of residence 
(due to the unavailability of the municipality of residence in the data) 
shows an increase similar to the one observed for the department of 
the workplace, for an increase of one point between 1976 and 1993. We 
must further note that the fate of spatial segregation is somewhat dif-
ferent in Île-de-France and in the provinces. In Île-de-France, the ten-
dency is a rise in spatial segregation on the order of 1.2 points, while in 
the provinces, spatial segregation appears to have fallen on the order of 
half a point.9 Thus we return to Nina Guyon’s observation (2004) of a 
clear rise in segregation between 2000 and 2002, followed by stability.10
The overall observation, then, oscillates between stability and a 
slight increase in spatial segregation (for workplaces in general and for 
residences in Île-de-France). In any case, we observe no great upheaval 
and a milder rise than the phenomenon observed in the United States 
(Reardon and Bischoff 2011), where the increase in inequality has 
existed longer and is more sustained. Nevertheless, the overall indexes 
tend to add up uniformly phenomena that do not necessarily have the 
same meaning, such as, for example, a phenomenon of segregation or 
desegregation in the median or extreme quantiles.
Figure 8 presents a breakdown of the aggregate dissimilarity 
index according to our five relative wage classifications. As others 
have previously shown (Maurin 2004; Préteceille 2006; Guyon 2012), 
the phenomenon of social concentration according to income level 
primarily affects high incomes rather than low. In 2008, in order to 
obtain a proportional distribution of different classifications in each 
municipality, you would need to displace at least 14% of the lowest 
9. The department of residence is often uncertain in the 1994 data, particularly in
Île-de-France. This led us to take 1995 as a point of reference. We are subtracting the jump 
linked to the change in sets in 2001 from our progression.
10. Let us note that Guyon’s observation of overall stability was based in part on the
year 2009, a year of deep recession that affected some high incomes (due to the disappear-
ance of bonuses in some sectors) and modified the spatial concentration of the very wealthy.
D
ocum
ent downloaded from
 www.cairn-int.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.93 - 24/07/2014 11h31. © P.U.F. 
Financialization and Sociospatial Divides XXV
quartile, 13% of the two median quartiles, 17% of the F75-90, 31% of 
the F90-99, and 50% of the highest percentile of wages. Of course, 
equiproportionality is very hypothetical and there is very little chance 
of coming across such an arrangement “by chance,” especially in small 
municipalities. We have therefore calculated (for the year 2007), based 
on twenty simulations, the deviation from equiproportionality that 
would result from the chance allocation of persons of different classes 
in the different municipalities (keeping their current size). The “ran-
domized” Duncan indexes would be as follows: 2.8% for the F0-10, 
2.5% for the F25-75, 3.4% for the F75-90, 4.3% for the F90-99, and 
12.3% for the F99-100.11 Even once we have determined the chance 
element of this separatism, the observation of a stronger separatism at 
the top of the hierarchy is not upset. 
Figure 8: Breakdown of residential spatial segregation 
by wage classification
Note: In 2008, the index of dissimilarity based on municipalities of residence rose to 
50% for F99-100, the percentile of the best paid employees. At least 50% of the 
population of the top 1% would have to move to obtain an equiproportional 
distribution.
Source: Exhaustive Files (1994-2008) and DADS Sample (1976-2007).
11. The standard deviations for these simulations are very low, ranging between 0.1%
and 0.6%.
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In fact, some municipalities have a strong concentration of indi-
viduals belonging to the top 1%. In 2007, among the municipali-
ties that were home to over one hundred private-sector employees, 
the following have the strongest concentration of the working rich: 
Aigremont (24%), Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche (23%), Feucherolles 
(20%), Marnes-la-Coquettes (19%), Fourqueux (19%), Chavenay 
(18%), Mareil-Marly (17%), Neuilly-sur Seine (17%). For the most 
part, these municipalities are located in the western suburbs of Paris, 
in the Yvelines and Hauts-de-Seine departments, surrounded by 
wooded areas and golf courses. The top arrondissements of Paris, 
such as the 7th and the 16th (14%), are a bit farther down the list. 
The 7th, however, retains the top position, among municipalities with 
at least one thousand private-sector employees, in the category of 
percentage of residents in the top 0.1% (4%), ahead of Neuilly-sur-
Seine (3.7%).
Aside from these variations of segregation by wage level, figure 8 
highlights their conflicting trends between 1995 and 2008. Earners in 
the lowest quartile, and even those in the middle quantiles (F75-90 
in particular), tended to experience something of a desegregation, 
with the lowest quartile seeing a two-point drop in its index. The 
concentration rate of top-decile earners, on the other hand, rose a bit 
(by one index point), and the top percentile’s rate rose more sharply 
(3.5 additional points, or a multiplication by 1.15). The trends in the 
indicators of exposure make it possible to examine in detail what the 
wealthiest workers are exposed to.12 On average, 58% of the work-
ers living in the same municipality as these individuals were in the 
lowest three wage quartiles in 2008; they had represented 61% of the 
population in 1995. The wealthiest are increasingly exposed to the 
top 10% of earners: the rate rose from 17.3% to 18.2% for the F90-99 
group and from 4% to 4.5% for the top 1%. 
Furthermore, in figure 9, we propose to study the evolution of 
the residential and workplace segregation of the top 1%, in France, 
Île-de-France, and the provinces. This analysis shows that, contrary to 
what we found in the aggregate index, residential segregation exceeds 
12. The exposure of group x to group y, xPy, is calculated as follows: xPy = ∑i (n
xi
/
n
x.
)*(n
yi
/n
.i
), where n
xi
 and n
yi
 represent, respectively, the numbers of groups x and y in the
geographic unit i; n
x.
 represents the total number of group x; and n
.i
 represents the number 
of unit i (Massey and Denton 1988).
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workplace segregation among the highest earners. Thus, in 2007, the 
city in which the largest number of top-percentile earners worked 
(among cities with over 1,000 employees) was Courbevoie, with a 
rate of 8%, which represents a far weaker concentration than the 
residential concentration of Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche (23%). Never-
theless, it is in the workplace that spatial concentration has advanced 
the most: 10 additional points and multiplication by 1.5 (based on 
municipality) or 1.6 (based on department) between 1976 and 2007, 
and 7 additional points and a multiplication by 1.3 between 1995 
and 2008. During the same period of time, the residential separatism 
of the highest earners grew by only 3.5 points. The second finding 
is that the segregation of the wealthiest increased twice as much in 
Île-de-France as it did in the provinces. The residential dissimilarity 
rate in Île-de-France rose by 3 points, vs. 1.8 in the provinces; the 
workplace rate rose by 8 points, vs. 3 points in the provinces. The dif-
ference in heterogeneity has thus only grown. 
Figure 9: Development of the separation of the top 1%
Note: In 2008, the dissimilarity index of Île-de-France top 1% based on municipality 
of residence (exhaustive) rose to 50%. Thus at least 50% of Île-de-France top 1% 
would have to move to achieve an equiproportional distribution in this region.
Source: Exhaustive Files (1994-2008) and DADS Sample (1976-2007).
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 Focusing on the highest-paid one percent of earners, then, one 
can conclude that there is a clear trend toward more segregation, 
especially in Île-de-France. This observation is consistent with both 
Saskia Sassen’s general framework regarding global cities and Edmond 
Préteceille’s analysis (2006) of the spatial segregation of private-sector 
executives in Île-de-France. It may appear to be out of step with Nina 
Guyon’s results (2012), which allowed her to conclude, based on an 
analysis of the top decile, that segregation is stabilizing at the top. 
However, her results, which are based on a different population, do 
not analyze the specific fortune of the members of the top 1%, and 
are affected in part by the 2009 recession.
4.An Evaluation of the Impact of Financialization
We have shown that, during the time when financialization was 
transforming the position and composition of the wage elite, they 
tended to live and to work (in more modest proportions) in a manner 
more separated from the rest of the other wage quantiles. This simul-
taneity is insufficient evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship. 
In an effort to evaluate this more specifically, we propose to carry 
out a counterfactual exercise: trying to calculate what the level of 
spatial segregation would have been in the absence of the financial-
ization process. We will restrict this exercise to the financialization of 
the financial sector, since we have only poorly identified the finan-
cialization of nonfinancial companies. As an indicator of the finan-
cialization of finance, we will use one of its clear, direct consequences: 
the explosion of top wages and inequality within the financial sector. 
The counterfactual experiment thus consists of replacing the finance 
workers from 2007 with those from 1995, with their share of total 
wages and their municipalities of residence and work.13 The differ-
ence between the real trend and the counterfactual trend will allow 
13. The number of finance workers was lower in 1995 than in 2007, due to the
overall growth of the workforce and, especially, the difference in the sets in 2001 (the date 
from which it becomes possible to follow better a portion of multijob workers; see box). In 
order to obtain the financial population in 1995 (404,069) with numbers equivalent to the 
2007 population (473,572), we have supplemented it with a sample of 69,503 individuals 
drawn at random from the 1995 population. Since in this counterfactual population the 
sum of finance workers’ share of total wages in 1995 and that of nonfinance workers in 
2007 cannot add up to 100%, we are normalizing the shares by dividing by the latter sum.
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us to identify the impact of financialization. Let us note that, to the 
extent that the distortion of wages in the financial sector is an incom-
plete measure of financialization, it is likely that we are somewhat 
underestimating the sociospatial impact of financialization.
Table 1: Simulation replacing finance employees of 2007 
with those from 1995
1995
Real
2007
Real
2007 
Counterfactual
Contribution 
of Finance
Share of the quantile
top 1% 5,44% 6,96% 6,57% 26%
top 0.1% 1,09% 1,94% 1,66% 33%
Share working in the 
provinces
top 1% 38,2% 35,6% 36,8% 45%
top 0.1% 27,1% 21,7% 25,4% 68%
Dissimilarity index-
Municipality of 
residence
F0-25 14,5% 13,8% 13,7% ns
F25-75 12,6% 13,0% 13,0% ns
F75-90 17,1% 17,0% 17,1% ns
F90-99 29,7% 30,8% 30,4% 40%
F99-100 47,0% 49,6% 48,6% 38%
Of which top 0.1% 66,4% 69,6% 67,2% 76%
Total 16,7% 16,8% 16,7% ns
Department of residence top 0.1% 49,4% 56,7% 52,2% 62%
Municipality of 
workplace
F0-25 19,4% 21,3% 21,4% ns
F25-75 15,0% 18,1% 18,2% ns
F75-90 20,6% 20,7% 20,9% ns
F90-99 29,3% 33,0% 32,5% 14%
F99-100 39,3% 45,9% 44,8% 16%
Of which top 0.1% 56,2% 64,4% 61,1% 39%
Total 19,5% 21,8% 21,8% ns
Department of 
workplace top 0.1% 46,0% 55,7% 51,0% 49%
Note: 38.2% of employees in the top percentile lived in the provinces in 1995; 35.6% 
lived there in 2007. This rate would have been 36.8 if the finance sector of 2007 had 
retained the same places of residence and work and the same salary amount as in 
1995. The transformations of the finance sector thus have contributed to 45% of the 
development of the top 1% between 1995 and 2007.
Source: DADS Exhaustive Files 1995 and 2007.
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Table 1 presents the results of such an analysis. As we have already 
demonstrated by another method (Godechot 2012), the rise in wages 
in finance has had a noticeable impact on the structure of inequality. 
Without it, the growth of the top percentile’s share would have been 
26% lower, and the top 0.1%’s share 33% lower.
This effect on overall inequality is also expressed spatially. The 
Paris-province distribution of elite wages also would have been differ-
ent. The decline of the provinces in the top 1% and (even more so) in 
the top 0.1% would have been less pronounced: the drop would have 
been reduced by 45% for the top 1% and by 70% for the top 0.1%. 
The increase, albeit a moderate one, in the residential segregation of 
the top earners would have been 40% less. Curiously, the clearer rise 
in workplace segregation seems less affected by the process of finan-
cialization, the impact of which is just 16%. This effect is perhaps the 
result of the complexity of the dynamic of professional establishment 
at the municipality level. On the other hand, once we look on a larger 
scale, such as the department, we get a more substantial contribution 
from financialization on the separation of the highest earners. 
To summarize this counterfactual analysis, then, we would say that 
the financialization of the financial sector, seen through the deforma-
tion of the wage structure in that sector, contributed to 20-40% of 
the rise in the top percentile’s sociospatial segregation and 40-70% of 
the segregation of the top 0.1% of earners in France. 
*
The first contribution of this article is to illustrate several trends 
regarding sociospatial inequality. The rise in high wages and wage 
inequality in France is centered mainly in Île-de-France, which 
has led to the disappearance of residents of the provinces from the 
ranks of the high-earning elite. Measured in the aggregate on the 
basis of municipality, residential sociospatial segregation has certainly 
remained stable from 1995 to 2008. On the other hand, the segrega-
tion of the best-compensated workers has indeed increased during 
the same period, especially when measured in Île-de-France alone or 
on the basis of workplaces. 
The second contribution is to isolate one of the determinants of 
this trend: financialization. This movement, with principally affects a 
small elite, is admittedly not fundamentally upending the aggregate 
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measures of inequality or spatial segregation, but it nonetheless pro-
duces noticeable effects on wage inequality and spatial inequality sur-
rounding the highest wages. Thus we show that it is responsible for 
at least 20-30% of their increase and that it is helping to widen the 
gap between Île-de-France and the provinces. One important point 
to continue this work would be to analyze the interaction between 
these trends and the differentiated price dynamics in the two subsets 
on the real estate market.14 
The gap between Paris and “the French desert” is a well-known 
and long-condemned phenomenon (Gravier 1947). The traditional 
reading of this phenomenon is above all political (the weight of 
monarchical and Jacobin tradition) and cultural (the centralization of 
cultural and journalistic life). Today, it is primarily the current eco-
nomic and financial changes that are leading to a reinforcement of 
this imbalance. We are admittedly lacking a globalization indicator to 
separate what is due to financialization and what is due to nonfinan-
cial globalization. Through the example of Paris, however, it seems 
that it is primarily financialization, rather than globalization, that is 
leading to the increased domination of the major megacities. Are 
not Paris, New York, London, and Tokyo primarily “financial cities,” 
rather than “global cities” (Sassen)? A comparative study of countries 
in which the economic, financial, political, and cultural functions of 
the great megacities are separated (Italy, the Netherlands, and Ger-
many, for example) could shine a light on the foundations of their 
domination and its renewal.
Olivier Godechot
Sciences Po, MaxPo and OSC-CNRS
Olivier GODECHOT, a CNRS researcher at Sciences Po, 
MaxPo and OSC-CNRS, specialized in the emerging field of sociol-
ogy of finance. In 2001, he published Les Traders (La Découverte), a 
detailed analysis of the work organization, hierarchies, and modes of 
14. Such a connection does not seem so simple at first glance. Indeed, a comparison
of the price indexes of apartments in Paris and in cities of over ten thousand residents in 
the provinces since 1994 shows an increasing divergence, both during the late 1990s and, 
especially, since 2007. On the other hand, during the period from 2001 to 2006, the rate of 
price increases was slightly higher in the provinces. See “Séries longues : Indices Notaires 
– Insee des prix des logements anciens,” Institut national de la statistique et des études
économiques, http://www.insee.fr/fr/indicateurs/ind96/20100225/sl.xls.
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reasoning in use on the trading floor, and in 2007, he published Working 
Rich, a book dealing more specifically with the determination of wages 
in the finance industry. Since then, he has been working on the macro-
social impact of finance on the rest of society. Furthermore, he is simul-
taneously developing research on the academic world, its job market, 
networks, and recruitment processes, as well as wage satisfaction. 
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Appendix
Evolution of relationships between the thresholds of wage distribution 
in Île-de-France and in the provinces 
Note: In 2007, the threshold for P99 salaries in Île-de-France (the level above 
which the highest-paid 1% are found) was 1.9 times higher than the P99 in 
the provinces. P99: lower limit of the highest-paid 1%; P95: lower limit of the 
highest-paid 5%; P90: lower limit of the top decile; P10: upper limit of the lowest 
decile; Q1: upper limit of the first quartile; Q3: upper limit of the third quartile.
Sources: DADS Panel (1976-2007).
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
p10
q1
medi
an
q3
p90
D
ocum
ent downloaded from
 www.cairn-int.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.93 - 24/07/2014 11h31. © P.U.F. 
